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Abstract
We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a
binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We dene ex ante
vote-trading equilibrium, identify weak su¢ cient conditions for existence, and construct one
such equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium must always result in dictatorship and the
market generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large
enough. We test the theoretical implications by implementing a competitive vote market in
the laboratory using a continuous open-book multi-unit double auction.
JEL Classication: C72, C92, D70, P16
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1 Introduction
When confronted with the choice between two alternatives, groups, committees, and legisla-
tures typically rely on majority rule. They do so for good reasons: as shown by May (1952),
in binary choices, majority rule is the unique fair, decisive and monotonic rule. In addition,
majority rule creates incentives for sincere voting: in environments with private values, it
does so regardless of the information that voters have about otherspreferences. A long
tradition in political theory analyzes conditions under which majority voting yields optimal
public decisions or has other desirable properties.1
An obvious weakness of majority rule is its failure to reect intensity of preferences: an
almost indi¤erent majority will always prevail over an intense minority. However, if votes can
be freely traded as if they were commodities, then preference intensities could be reected in
the nal vote. A natural intuition comes from the general theory of competitive equilibrium.
Just as markets allocate goods in a way that reects preferences, vote markets may allow
voters who care more about the decision to buy more votes (and hence more inuence),
compensating other voters with money transfers (see, e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962,
Coleman, 1966, Haefele, 1971, Mueller, 1973, and Philipson and Snyder, 1996). However,
to date there is no adequate model of decentralized trade for vote markets and so general
questions about equilibrium allocations when voters can exchange votes with each other
remain unanswered.
In particular this article seeks to answer, in the context of a relatively simple environment,
two basic questions about vote trading in committees operating under majority rule. First,
from a positive standpoint, what allocations and outcomes will arise in equilibrium if votes
can be freely exchanged for a numeraire commotidy in a competitive market? Second, what
are the welfare implications of these equilibrium outcomes, compared to a purely democratic
majority rule institution where buying and selling of votes is not possible?
To answer these questions, we develop a competitive equilibrium model of vote markets
where members of a committee buy and sell votes among themselves in exchange for money.
The committee decides on a binary issue in two stages. In the rst stage, members participate
in a perfectly competitive vote market; in the second stage, all members cast their vote(s)
for their favorite alternative, and the committee decision is taken by majority rule.
1Condorcet (1787) remains the classic reference. Among modern formal approaches, see for example
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Ledyard and Palfrey (2002) or Dasgupta and Maskin (2008).
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The main critique against vote markets arises from the externalities that bilateral vote
trading imposes on third parties. Brams and Riker (1973), for instance, present examples
in which exchanges of votes across issues are protable to the pair of traders involved, and
yet the committee obtains a Pareto inferior outcome. McKelvey and Ordeshook (1980) test
the hypothesis in experimental data and conclude that the examples are not just theoretical
curiosities, but can actually be observed in the laboratory. But there is no clear theoretical
work that identies exactly when we should expect such vote trading ine¢ ciencies to arise
in general, and when instead more positive results might emerge.2
A major theoretical obstacle to understanding how vote trading works in general is that
in the standard competitive model of exchange, equilibrium (as well as other standard con-
cepts such as the core) often fail to exist (Park, 1967; Kadane, 1972; Bernholtz, 1973, 1974;
Ferejohn, 1974; Schwartz 1977, 1981; Shubik and Van der Heyden, 1978; Weiss, 1988, Philip-
son and Snyder, 1996, Piketty, 1994). Philipson and Snyder (1996) illustrate the point with
an example along the lines of the following: Suppose there are three voters, Lynn and Lucy,
on one side of an issue, and Mary, with more intense preferences than either Lynn or Lucy,
on the other. Any positive price supporting a vote allocation where either side has more
than two votes cannot be an equilibrium: one vote is redundant, and for any positive price
it will be o¤ered for sale. Any positive price supporting Marys purchase of one vote cannot
be an equilibrium: if Mary buys one vote, say Lynns, then Lucys vote is worthless, so Lucy
would be willing to sell it for any positive price - again there is excess supply. But any
positive price supporting no trade cannot be an equilibrium either: if the price is at least as
high as Marys high valuation, both Lynn and Lucy prefer to sell, and again there is excess
supply; if the price is lower than Marys valuation, Mary prefers to buy and there is excess
demand. Finally, at zero price, the losing side always demands a vote, and again there must
be excess demand. Philipson and Snyder (1996) and Koford (1982) circumvent the problem
of nonexistence by formulating models with centralized markets and a market-maker. Both
papers argue that vote markets are generally benecial.
Other researchers have conjectured, plausibly, that nonexistence arises in this example
because the direction of preferences is known, and hence losing votes are easily identied and
worthless (Piketty, 1994). According to this view, the problem should not occur if voters
are uncertain about others voterspreferences. But in fact nonexistence is still a problem.
In our example, suppose that Mary, Lynn, and Lucy each know their own preferences but
2There are of course other possible critiques, on distributional and philosophical grounds.
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otherwise only know that the other two are equally likely to prefer either alternative. A
positive price supporting an allocation of votes such that all are concentrated in the hands
of one of them cannot be an equilibrium: as in the discussion above, one vote is redundant,
and the voter would prefer to sell it. But any positive price supporting an allocation where
one individual holds two votes cannot be an equilibrium either: that individual holds the
majority of votes and thus dictates the outcome; the remaining vote is worthless and would
be put up for sale. Finally, a price supporting an allocation where Mary, Lynn and Lucy
each hold one vote cannot be an equilibrium. By buying an extra vote, each of them can
increase the probability of obtaining the desired alternative from 3/4 (the probability that
at least one of the other two agrees with her) to 1; by selling their vote, each decreases such
a probability from 3/4 to 1/2 (the probability that the 2-vote individual agrees). Recall that
Marys preferences are the most intense, and suppose Lynns are weakest. Thus if the price
is lower than 1/4 Marys high valuation, Mary prefers to buy, and if the price is higher than
1/4 Lynns low valuation, Lynn prefers to sell. The result must be either excess demand,
or excess supply, or both, in all cases an imbalance. The conclusion is that there is still no
general model of decentralized vote markets for which a competitive equilibrium exists.
A market for votes has several characteristics that distinguish it from neoclassical en-
vironments. First, the commodities being traded (votes) are indivisible.3 Second, these
commodities have no intrinsic value. Third, because the votes held by one voter can a¤ect
the payo¤s to other voters, vote markets bear some similarity to markets for commodities
with externalities: demands are interdependent, in the sense that an agents own demand is
a function of not only the prices, but also the demands of other traders. Fourth, payo¤s are
discontinuous at the points in which majority changes, and at this point many voters may
be pivotal simultaneously.
In this paper, we respond to these challenges by modifying the concept of equilibrium.
Specically, we propose a notion of equilibrium that we call Ex Ante Equilibrium. As in the
competitive equilibrium of an exchange economy with externalities, we require voters to best
reply both to the equilibrium price and to other votersdemands. In addition, to solve the
non-convexity problem, we allow for mixed i.e., probabilisticdemands. This introduces
the possibility that markets will not clear. Thus, instead of requiring that supply equals
3For discussions of nonexistence problems in general equilibrium models with indivisible goods, see Be-
via et al (1999), Bikhchandani & Mamer (1997), Danilov et al (2001), Fujishige and Yang (2002), Gul &
Stacchetti (1999) or Yang (2000).
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demand in equilibrium with probability one, in the ex ante vote trading equilibrium we
require market clearing only in expectation. The ex post clearing of the market is obtained
through a rationing rule.4
In our model individuals have privately known preferences, and we prove existence of an
ex ante vote trading equilibrium for a large set of parameters under a particular rationing
rule. The proof is constructive. One striking property of the equilibrium is that there is
always a dictator: i.e., when the market closes, one voter owns (n+1)=2 votes. The dictator
must be one of the two individuals with most intense preferences. When the number of
voters is small and the discrepancy between the highest valuations and all others is large,
the market for votes may increase expected welfare. But the required condition for e¢ ciency
gains is highly restrictive, increasingly so for larger numbers of voters. We show that if the
number of voters is su¢ ciently large, the market must be less e¢ cient than simple majority
voting without a vote market.
We test our theoretical results in an experiment by implementing the market in a labo-
ratory with a continuous open-book multi-unit double auction.. Observed transaction prices
support the the comparative statics properties of the ex ante competitive equilibrium. Price
levels are generally higher than the risk-neutral equilibrium price. The prices fall over time
with experience, but in most cases remain signicantly higher than the risk neutral prices.
We show that equilibrium price levels will be higher with risk-averse traders, while the com-
parative statics results remain unchanged, therby providing one possible explanation for
experimental ndings. Vote allocations are close to the ex ante equilibrium allocations, and
the empirical e¢ ciency of our laboratory markets closely tracks the theory.
Two other strands of literature are not directly related to the present article, but should
be mentioned. First, there is the important but di¤erent literature on vote markets where
candidates or lobbies buy votersor legislatorsvotes: for example, Myerson (1993), Grose-
close & Snyder (1996), Dal Bo (2007), Dekel, Jackson andWolinsky (2008) and (2009). These
papers di¤er from the problem we study because in our case vote trading happens within
the committee (or the electorate). The individuals buying votes are members, not external
subjects, groups or parties. Second, vote markets are not the only remedy advocated for ma-
jority rules failure to recognize intensity of preferences in binary decisions. The mechanism
4Mixed demands have been used elsewhere in general equilibrium analysis, for example in Prescott and
Townsend (1982). In their model, markets clear exactly, even with mixed demands, because there is a
continuum of agents and no aggregate uncertainty. In our markets the number of agents is nite and there
is aggregate uncertainty.
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design literature has proposed mechanisms with side payments, building on Groves-Clarke
taxes (e.g., dApremont and Gerard-Varet 1979). However, these mechanisms have problems
with bankruptcy, individual rationality, and/or budget balance (Green and La¤ont 1980,
Mailath and Postlewaite 1990). A more recent literature has suggested alternative voting
rules without transfers. Casella (2005), Jackson & Sonnenschein (2007) and Hortala-Vallve
(2007) propose mechanisms whereby agents can e¤ectively reect their relative intensities
and improve over majority rule, by linking decisions across issues. Casella, Gelman & Palfrey
(2007), Casella, Palfrey and Riezman (2008), Engelmann and Grimm (2008), and Hortala-
Vallve & Llorente-Saguer (2009) test the performance of these mechanisms experimentally
and nd that e¢ ciency levels are very close to theoretical equilibrium predictions, even in
the presence of some deviations from theoretical equilibrium strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 denes the basic setup of our
model. Section 2.2 introduces the notion of ex ante equilibrium. Section 2.3 presents the
rationing rule. Section 2.4 shows existence by characterizing an equilibrium. Section 2.5
compares welfare obtained in equilibrium to simple majority rule. We then turn to the
experimental part. Section 3 describes the design of the experiment, and section 4 describes
the experimental results. Finally, section 5 discusses possible extensions. Section 6 concludes,
and the Appendix collects all proofs.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Because we dene a new equilibrium concept, we present it in a general setting. Some of the
parameters will be specialized in our subsequent analysis and in the experiment. Consider
a committee N of voters, N = f1; 2; :::ng, n odd, deciding on a single binary issue through
a two-stage procedure. Each voter i is endowed with an amount mi of the numeraire, and
with wi 2 Z indivisible votes, where Z is the set of integers. Both m = (m1; :::;mn) and
w = (w1; :::; wn) are common knowledge. In the rst stage, voters can buy votes from each
other using the numeraire; in the second stage, voters cast their vote(s), if any, for one of
the two alternatives, and a committee decision, C, is taken according to the majority of
votes cast. Ties are resolved by a coin ip. The model of exchange naturally focuses on
the rst stage and we simply assume that in the second stage voters vote for their favorite
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alternative.5
The two alternatives are denoted by A = f; g, and voter is favorite alternative, ai 2 A,
is privately known. For each i the probability that ai =  is equal to i and  = (1; :::; n)
is common knowledge. Let Si = fs 2 Z   wig be the set of possible demands of each
agent.6 That is, agent i can o¤er to sell some or all of his votes, do nothing, or demand any
positive amount of votes. The set of actions of voter i is the set of probability measures on
Si, denoted i. We write S = S1  ::: Sn and let  = 1  ::: n. Elements of  are of
the form q : S ! R where
P
s2S q (s) = 1 and q (s)  0 for all s 2 S.
We allow for an equilibrium in mixed strategies where, ex post, the aggregate amounts of
votes demanded and of votes o¤ered need not coincide. A rationing rule R is an institution
that maps the prole of votersdemands to a feasible allocation of votes. We denote the set
of feasible vote allocations by X =

x 2 Zn+
Pxi =Pwi	. Formally, a rationing rule R
is a function from realized demand proles to the set of probability distributions over vote
allocations: R : S ! X where xi 2 ]wi; wi + si[ 8i and R (s) = w + s if
P
si = 0. Hence,
a rationing rule must fulll several conditions: a) R cannot assign less (more) votes than
the initial endowment if the demand is positive (negative), b) R cannot assign more (less)
votes than the initial endowment plus the demand if the demand is positive (negative) and
c) if aggregate demand and aggregate supply of votes coincide, then all agentsdemands are
satised.
The particular (mixed) action prole,  2 , and the rationing rule, R, jointly imply
a probability distribution over the set of nal vote allocations that we denote as r;R (x).
In addition, for every possible allocation we dene the probability that the committee de-
cision coincides with voter is favorite alternative, a probability we denote by 'x;ai; :=
Pr (C = aijx; ) - where x 2 X is the vote allocation and a 2 A.
Finally, we dene voterspreferences. The preferences of voter i are represented by a von
Neuman Morgenstern utility function ui, a concave function of the argument vi1C=ai +mi 
(xi   wi) p, where vi 2 [0; 1] is a privately known valuation earned if the committee decision
C coincides with the voters preferred alternative ai, 1x is the indicator function, mi is is
endowment of the numeraire, (xi   wi) is is net demand for votes, and p is the transaction
price per vote.
We can now dene Ui (;R; p), the ex ante utility of voter i given some action prole,
5Equivalently, we could model a two stage game and focus on weakly undominated strategies.
6Negative demands correspond to supply.
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the rationing rule, and a vote price p:
Ui (;R; p) =
X
x2X
r;< (x)
"
'x;ai;  ui (vi +mi   (xi   wi) p)
+(1  'x;ai;)  ui (mi   (xi   wi) p)
#
One can see in the formula that the uncertainty about the nal outcome depends on three
factors: a) the action prole, b) the rationing rule and c) the preferences of other voters.
2.2 Ex Ante Vote Trading Equilibrium
Denition 1 The set of actions  and the price p constitute an Ex Ante Vote Trad-
ing Equilibrium (or, simply, Ex Ante Equilibrium) relative to rationing rule R if the
following conditions are satised:
1. Utility maximization: For each agent i, i satises
i 2 argMax
i2i
Ui
 
i; 

 i; R; p

2. Expected market clearing: In expectation, the market clears, i.e.,
X
s2S
q (s)
nX
i=1
si = 0
The denition of the equilibrium shares some features of competitive equilibrium with
externalities (e.g., Arrow and Hahn, 1971, pp. 132-6). Optimal demands are interrelated, and
thus equilibrium requires voters to best reply to the demands of other voters. In contrast, the
standard notion of competitive equilibrium for good markets requires agents to best-respond
only to the price. The di¤erence between the Ex Ante Equilibrium and the competitive
equilibrium with externalities is that the former notion requires market clearing only in
expected terms. The fact that demand and supply do not necessarily balance is the reason
for the introduction of the rationing rule.7
7There always exists a trivial equilibrium, where, independently of the particular rationing rule and
endowments, all voters neither demand nor o¤er any vote: the market clears and, since the probability of
being rationed is 1, all voters are maximizing utility. This paper focuses on a nontrivial equilibrium where
some trade occurs.
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2.3 Rationing by voter
In general, the specication of the rationing rule can a¤ect the existence (or not) of the
equilibrium, and if an equilibrium exists, its properties. In this paper, we mainly focus
on one specic rule, rationing-by-voter (R1), whereby each voter either fullls his demand
(supply) completely or is excluded from trade. After voters submit their orders, demanders
and suppliers of votes are randomly ranked in a list, all rankings having the same probability.
Then demands are satised in turn: the demand of the rst voter on the list is satised with
the rst supplier(s) on the list; then the demand of the second voter on the list is satised
with the rst supplier(s) on the list with o¤ers still outstanding, and so on. In case someones
demand cannot be satised, the voter is left with his initial endowment, and the process goes
on with the next of the list.
R1 fullls the conditions given in section 2.1. However, one aspect of this rationing rule
is that it is possible for both sides of the market to be rationed. For example:
Example 1 Suppose that voters 1, 2 and 3 o¤er to sell one vote and that voters 4 and 5
demand 2 votes each. The total supply (3 votes) is less than the total demand (4 votes). R1
will result in one supplier and one demander left with their initial endowments.
We show in section 5 that our results continue to hold with little change under an al-
ternative rationing rule we call rationing-by-vote (R2), where individual votes supplied are
randomly allocated to each voter with an unfullled demand. With R2, only the long side
of the market is rationed, but individuals must accept, and pay for, orders that are only
partially lled.
2.4 Equilibrium
For the rest of the paper we assume that each voter prefers either alternative with probability
1/2 (i = 0:5) and is initially endowed with one vote (wi = 1). In addition, we assume for
now that all individuals are risk-neutral; in section 5 we show that the results extend to risk
averse preferences. For simplicity, we set the initial endowment of money to zero (mi = 0 for
all i)the value of mi plays no role with risk-neutrality, and thus the restriction is with no
loss of generality; depending on preferences, it could play a role with risk aversion. In this
section we prove by construction the existence of an ex ante equilibrium when the rationing
rule is R1 and a weak su¢ cient condition is satised.
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Voters are ordered according to increasing valuation: v1 < v2 < ::: < vn.
Theorem 1 Suppose i =
1
2
, wi = 1, and mi = 0 8i, agents are risk neutral, and R1 is the
rationing rule. Then for all n there exists a nite threshold n  1 such that if vn  nvn 1,
the following set of price and actions constitute an Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium:
1. Price p = vn 1
n+1
.
2. Voters 1 to n  2 o¤er to sell their vote with probability 1.
3. Voter n demands n 1
2
votes with probability 1.
4. Voter n   1 o¤ers to sell his vote with probability 2
n+1
, and demands n 1
2
votes with
probability n 1
n+1
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In this equilibrium, voters 1 to n   2 always o¤er to sell their vote, and voter n always
demands the minimum number of votes to ensure himself a simple majority. The price
makes voter n  1 indi¤erent between demanding the number of votes that would give him
a majority and o¤ering his own vote for sale. Finally, ex ante market clearing pins down the
probability with which voter n  1 randomizes between o¤ering to buy and o¤ering to sell.
The equilibrium has four key features. First, and most striking, after rationing either
voter n or voter n  1 will have a majority of votes: in equilibrium there always is a dicta-
tor. A market for votes does not distribute votes somewhat equally among high valuation
individuals: in our ex ante vote trading equilibrium, it concentrates all decision-power in
the hands of a single voter. The dictator will be voter n with probability n+3
2(n+1)
, and voter
n  1 with complementary probability n 1
2(n+1)
; in either case, the dictator pays n 1
2
voters for
their votes.
Second, the price of a vote is linked to the second highest valuation. The market can
be loosely thought of as analogous to auctioning o¤ the right to be a dictator on the issue,
and thus it is not surprising that the equilibrium price is determined by the second highest
valuation. In fact, the equilibrium price is precisely the price at which the second highest
valuation voter is indi¤erent between "winning" the dictatorship or selling his vote and
letting someone else be the dictator. Note that the value added from being dictator is
bounded below 1/2 (1, the upper boundary of the support of vi, times 1/2, the probability
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that the voter who has become dictator in ones stead favors the same alternative), while in
the limit, as n approaches1, more and more votes are needed to become dictator. Thus the
equilibrium price per vote must converge to zero. On the other hand, the total cost or "price
of dictatorship" in the market is n 1
2
 vn 1
n+1
, which converges to vn 1
2
, the value of dictatorship
to the second highest valuation voter.
Third, rationing occurs with probability 1: there is always either excess demand or
excess supply of votes. The larger the committee size, the higher the probability that voter
n   1 demands votes, and thus the higher the probability of positive excess demand. As n
approaches1, with probability approaching 1, demand exceeds supply by one vote. Relative
to the amounts traded, the imbalance is of order O(1=n), and thus negligible in volume,
recalling analyses of competitive equilibria with non-convexities (in particular the notion of
Approximate Equilibrium, where in large economies allocations approach demands.8) But,
contrary to private goods markets, in our market the imbalance is never negligible in its
impact on welfare: it always triggers rationing and shuts (n  1)=2 voters out of the market.
Fourth, the existence of this equilibrium requires a su¢ cient "gap" between the highest
and the second highest valuation. The gap is needed it to ensure that voter n is not better
o¤ selling his vote than demanding n 1
2
at the equilibrium price, p = vn 1
n+1
. The assumption,
however, is very weak, in the sense that the required gap is extremely small. In the proof,
an exact bound is derived9: the condition reduces to a minimum required percentage gap
between vn and vn 1 of 3 percent when n = 7, declining thereafter, and rapidly converging
to 0 as n gets large. Figure 1 plots the required percentage gap (i.e., the minimum value of
vn   vn 1, normalized by vn 1 = 1) as a function of n.
2.5 Welfare
In this section we compare the welfare obtained in the ex ante equilibrium to a situation
without market, where voters simply cast their votes for their favorite alternative.
As remarked earlier, in the equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1 the vote market always
results in dictatorship, with the dictator being either the voter with highest valuation, or,
slightly less often, the voter with the second highest valuation. Even taking into account
the dictators high valuation, ignoring the will of all voters but one seems unlikely to be a
8See for example Starr (1969), and Arrow and Hahn (1971).
9n =
(n 1)(n+5)
(n+1)

n+3 (n 1n 1
2
)2 (n 3)

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Figure 1: Minimum gap as a function of the committee size n.
desirable rule. Indeed, our main welfare result is that if n is su¢ ciently large, the vote market
is ine¢ cient relative to the majority rule outcome with no trade. At smaller committee sizes,
the market can be welfare improving only if the prole of valuations is such that there is a
large di¤erence between the highest valuation (or two highest valuations) and the rest.
Ex ante welfare analysis is complicated by the requirement that valuations satisfy the
condition identied in Theorem 1. One alternative is to specify a joint distribution of valua-
tions F (v) with v = (v1; :::; vn) such that all draws of valuation proles admit the equilibrium
of Theorem 1. A simpler alternative, which we follow in this section, is to x n, and a prole
of valuations v that satises the condition in Theorem 1, and study the expected welfare
associated with such prole in an innite replication of the market and the vote. Focusing
on an innite replication means abstracting from specic realizations of the direction of pref-
erences, of the realized demand of voter n   1, and of the resolution of the rationing rule,
relying instead on the theoretical probabilities.
For given n and v, with v1 < ::: < vn, expected welfare with the market, WVM , and with
majority rule, WMR, are given by
WMR = [vn + vn 1 + (n  2) vn 2]

1
2
+

n  1
n 1
2

2 n

(1)
WVM =

n  2
2
vn 2 +
3n+ 1
4 (n+ 1)
vn 1 +
3n+ 5
4 (n+ 1)
vn

(2)
Note that the welfare comparison depends on four variables only: the highest valuation,
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vn, the second highest valuation, vn 1, the average of the remaining lower valuations, vn 2 =Pn 2
j=1 vj
n 2 , and the size of the committee, n. We can state:
Proposition 1 Fix n and a prole of valuations v with some vn; vn 1; and vn 2 > 0, and
such that vn  nvn 1. Then there always exists a nite n(vn; vn 1; vn 2) such that if n > n,
WVM < WMR.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The larger the number of voters, the larger is the expected cost of dictatorship, and the
more skewed the distribution of valuations must be for the market to be e¢ ciency enhancing.
At su¢ ciently large n, as long as vn= vn 2 is nite, the market must be ine¢ cient.
The result is illustrated in Figure 2. The gure plots the area in which the vote market
dominates majority rule, the area in which the reverse is true, and the very small area in
which the equilibrium of Theorem 1 does not exist. The vertical axis is the ratio of the
second to the highest valuation, vn 1
vn
, and the horizontal axis is the ratio of the average of
valuations v1 to vn 2 to the highest valuation,
vn 2
vn
, for the cases of n = 5, 9, 51, and 501.
The two cases n = 5 and n = 9 are the committee sizes we study in the experiment, and
the symbols in the gures correspond to the experimental valuationsproles. At n = 501,
the region of possible realizations violating the condition in Theorem 1 cannot be detected
in the gure, and the vote market dominates majority rule only if the highest valuation is
at a minimum about twenty times as high as the average of valuations v1 to vn 2.
The conclusion, logically straightforward given Theorem 1, contradicts common intu-
itions about vote markets. In the absence of budget inequalities and common values, a
market for votes is often believed to dominate simple majority rule because it is expected to
redistribute voting power from low intensity voters to high intensity voters.10 Although such
a redistribution is conrmed in our analysis, in equilibrium it occurs in extreme fashion: the
e¢ ciency conjecture generally fails because all decision power is concentrated in the hands
of a single individual.
3 Experimental Design
A model of vote markets is di¢ cult if not impossible to be tested with existingdata: actual
vote trading is generally not available in the public record, and in many cases is prohibited
10Piketty (1994).
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Figure 2: Welfare graphs. The graphs show the area in which the equilibrium of Theorem
1 does not exist (black); the area in which majority rule dominates vote markets (light
grey), and the area in which vote markets dominate majority rule (dark grey). The symbols
corresponds to di¤erent experimental parameters. Triangle: HB, Diamond: HT, Square: LB
and Circle: LT.
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by law. We must turn to the economics laboratory. However, exactly how to do this is not
obvious. Like most competitive equilibrium theories, our modeling approach abstracts from
the exact details of a trading mechanism. Rather than specifying an exact game form, the
model is premised on the less precise assumption that under su¢ ciently competitive forces
the equilibrium price will emerge following the law of supply and demand. But because of the
nature of votes, a vote market di¤ers substantially from traditional competitive markets, and
our equilibrium concept is non-standard in the sense that markets clear only in expectation.
Does this new competitive equilibrium concept applied to the di¤erent voting environment
have any predictive value? Will a laboratory experiment organized in a similar way to
standard laboratory markets (Smith 1965) lead to prices, allocations and comparative statics
in accord with ex ante competitive equilibrium? These are the main question we address in
this and next section.
Experiments were conducted at the Social Sciences and Economics Laboratory at Caltech
during June 2009, with Caltech undergraduate students from di¤erent disciplines. Eight
sessions were run in total, four of them with ve subjects and four with nine. No subject
participated in more than one session. All interactions among subjects were computerized,
using an extension of the open source software package, Multistage Games.11
The voters in an experimental session constituted a committee whose charge was to decide
on a binary outcome, X or Y. Each subject was randomly assigned to be either in favor of X
or in favor of Y with equal probability and was given a valuation that s/he would earn if the
subjects preferred outcome was the committee decision. Subjects knew that others would
also prefer either X or Y with equal probability and that they were assigned valuations,
di¤erent for each subject, belonging to the range [1,1000], but did not know either others
preferred outcome or the realizations of valuations, nor were they given any information on
the distribution of valuations.
All subjects were endowed with one vote. After being told their own private valuation
and their own preferred outcome, but before voting, there was a 2 minute trading stage,
during which subjects had the opportunity to buy or sell votes. After the trading stage, the
process moved to the voting stage, where the decision was made by majority rule. At this
stage, voters simply cast all their votes which were automatically counted in favor of their
preferred outcome. Once all subjects had voted, the results were reported back to everyone
11Documentation and instructions for downloading the software can be found at
http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu.
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in the committee, the information was displayed in a history table on their computer screens,
viewable throughout the experiment.
We designed the trading mechanism as a continuous double auction, following closely the
experimental studies of competitive markets for private goods and assets (see for example
Smith, 1982, Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott 1982, Gray and Plott, 1990, and Davis and Holt,
1992). At any time during the trading period, any subject could post a bid or an o¤er for
one or multiple votes. Bid and o¤er prices (per vote) could be any integer in the range from
1 to 1000. New bids or o¤ers did not cancel any outstanding ones, if there were any. All
active bids or o¤ers could be accepted and this information was immediately updated on
the computer screens of all voters. A bid or o¤er for more than one unit was not transacted
until the entire order had been lled. Active bids or o¤ers that had not been fully transacted
could be cancelled at any time by the voter who placed the order. The number of votes that
di¤erent voters of the committee held was displayed in real time on each voters computer
screen and updated with every transaction. There were two additional trading rules. At
the beginning of the experiment, subjects were loaned an initial amount of cash of 10,000
points, and their cash holdings were updated after each transaction and at the end of the
voting stage. If their cash holdings ever became 0 or negative, they could not place any bid
nor accept any o¤er until their balance became positive again.12 Second, subjects could not
sell votes if they did not have any or if all the votes they owned were committed.
Once the voting stage was concluded, the procedure was repeated with the direction of
preference shu­ ed: subjects were again endowed with a single vote, valuation assignments
remained unchanged but the direction of preferences was reassigned randomly and indepen-
dently, and a new 2-minute trading stage started, followed by voting. We call each repetition,
for a given assignment of valuations, a round. After 5 rounds were completed, a di¤erent set
of valuations was assigned, and the game was again repeated for 5 rounds. We call each set
of 5 rounds with xed valuations a match. Each experimental session consisted of 4 matches,
that is, in each session subjects were assigned 4 di¤erent sets of valuations. Thus in total a
session consisted of 20 rounds.
The sets of valuations were designed according to two criteria. First, we wanted to
compare market behavior and pricing with valuations that were on average low (L), or on
average high (H); second, we wanted to compare results with valuations concentrated at
12The liquidity constraint was rarely binding, and bankruptcy never occurred. By the end of the last
market, all subjects had positive cash holdings, even after loan repayment.
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Valuation Number
Market 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
HT 190 319 433 537 635 728 784 903 957
LB 8 31 70 125 196 282 384 501 753
HB 14 56 127 226 353 508 691 903 957
LT 105 177 240 298 352 404 434 501 753
Table 1: Valuations of the di¤erent markets. In the case of n=5, only valuations in bold
were used.
the bottom of the distribution (B), and with valuations concentrated at the top (T). This
second feature was designed to test the theoretical welfare prediction: when valuations are
concentrated at the bottom, the wedge between the top valuations and all others is larger,
and thus the vote market should perform best, relative to majority voting. The B treatments
correspond to the triangle (HB) and square (LB) symbols in Figure 2
For either n = 5 or n = 9, each of the 4 combinations, LB, LT, HB and HT, thus
corresponds to a specic set of valuations. We call each a market. The exact values are
reproduced in Table 1 and plotted in Figure 3 13
Sessions with the same number of subjects di¤ered in the order of the di¤erent markets,
as described in Table 2. Because, for given n, the equilibrium price depends only on the
second highest valuation, HT and HB markets (and LT and LB markets) have the same
equilibrium price. Thus in each session we alternated H and L markets. In addition, be-
cause we conjectured that behavior in the experiment could be sensitive to the dispersion in
valuations, we alternated L and T markets. With these constraints, 4 experimental sessions
for each number of subjects were su¢ cient to implement all possible orders of markets.
At the beginning of each session, instructions were read by the experimenter standing
on a stage in the front of the experiment room.14 After the instructions were nished, the
experiment began. Subjects were paid the sum of their earnings over all 20 rounds multiplied
by a pre-determined exchange rate and a show-up fee of $10, in cash, in private, immediately
following the session. Sessions lasted on average one hour and fteen minutes, and subjects
average nal earnings were $29.
13Thus the experiment has 8 markets (4 markets for each of n = 5 and n = 9). We obtained the exact
numbers by choosing high values with no focal properties (vn = 957 and vn 1 = 903 for H, and vn = 753
and vn 1 = 501 for L) and deriving the remaining valuations through the rule: vi = vn 1

i
n 1
r
(with
some rounding) with r = 0:75 for T and r = 2 for B. .
14A sample copy of the instructions for the case of nine players is attached as an Appendix.
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Figure 3: Experimental valuations. Graphs on the top/bottom correspond to treatments
with committee size 5/9. Black/Gray graph correspond to treatments with high/low valu-
ations (H/L). Solid/Dashed lines correspond to treatments with valuations concentrated on
top/bottom (T/B).
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Match
Session 1 2 3 4
1 HT LB HB LT
2 LT HB LB HT
3 HB LT HT LB
4 LB HT LT HB
Table 2: Orders of di¤erent markets.
4 Experimental Results
We organize our discussion of the experimental results by focusing, in turn, on prices, nal
vote allocations, and e¢ ciency.
4.1 Prices
Figure 4 shows the transaction prices observed in the di¤erent markets, and the equilibrium
prices. It is clear from the graph that there is signicant overpricing: the percentage of
transaction prices above equilibrium is 84% and 99% for committees of sizes 5 and 9 respec-
tively. Risk aversion can explain part of the overpricing: equilibrium prices increase with the
degree of risk-aversion, as we show formally in section 5. However, part of the overpricing is
also due to inexperience, and transaction prices generally decline with experience.
Median prices are summarized in Table 3; the upper half of the table refers to n = 5
sessions, the lower half to n = 9 sessions. In both half tables, the equilibrium prices for each
market, rounded to the nearest integer, are in the rst row ("Theory"). The second row
("All") reports the median price for all transacted votes in each market, over all experimental
sessions (the number of transacted votes is in parenthesis). The third and fourth row report
median prices of transacted votes when subjects have gained some experience: in the third
row are median transacted prices when the given market is implemented as the fourth and
last match of the session ("Last match"); in the fourth row are median transacted prices
focusing only on the last 2 rounds (out of 5) of each match, again with the relevant number
of transacted votes in parenthesis. Thus "Last match" prices reect trading activity after
subjects have participated in three di¤erent markets for a total of fteen rounds, but have
no experience with the specic parameters for the given parameters of the fourth match.
"Last 2 rounds" prices reect trading activity after subjects have experienced three rounds
with the specic parameters of the given treatment, but have not necessarily had experience
18
Figure 4: Prices of traded votes in di¤erent markets. Horizontal lines indicate the equilibrium
prices. Vertical dashed lines indicate di¤erent rounds in a match.
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n LB LT HB HT
5 Theory 84 84 151 151
All 150 (47) 150 (43) 205 (47) 280 (46)
Last match 225 (11) 100 (7) 230 (16) 200 (18)
Last 2 rounds 150 (17) 150 (20) 203 (20) 275 (19)
9 Theory 50 50 90 90
All 150 (116) 180 (100) 200 (118) 200 (101)
Last match 130 (26) 100 (27) 180 (40) 190 (21)
Last 2 rounds 128 (52) 150 (34) 200 (51) 200 (40)
Table 3: Median Prices of Traded Votes. Number of transactions in parentheses.
with di¤erent market parameters.
The overpricing is clear in the table, particularly in markets with 9 participants. However,
the comparative statics implied by ex ante equilibrium are supported by the data. The
theory implies that the market price should be higher in H markets than in L markets,
and higher in markets with 5 participants than in markets with 9.15 There are in total 24
relevant comparisons between H and L market prices in the table, and in 23 out of 24 cases
the median price in the H markets is indeed higher.16 There are 12 relevant comparisons
between n = 5 and n = 9 markets, and again only in one case is the theoretical prediction
violated. The support for the committee size comparison is weakest in LT markets, where
the one violation occurs when the full data set is considered, and where experience leads to
equality in median prices but fails to deliver the disparity implied by the theory. In addition,
all else equal, the equilibrium price does not change between T and B markets. In the data
there are some minor di¤erences, but no systematic pattern.
As shown in Figure 4, overpricing is typically reduced by experience. Relative to median
prices in the full data set, median prices in the last 2 rounds of each match are either strictly
lower (in four treatments), or equal (in the remaining four treatments); median prices in the
last match are strictly lower than the overall median in six of eight treatments, the exceptions
being the two B treatments with n = 5.
These observations are statistically conrmed in a regression of all transaction prices on
dummies for market characteristics and time variables (match, round, and time within a
round). Prices are signicantly higher in H markets, while a null hypothesis of no di¤erence
15In fact, exactly twice as high, since p = vn 1=(n+ 1) and vn 1 is xed at the same value.
16The only exception is n = 5, median price in the last match only, comparing HT and LB markets.
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n = 5 n = 9
Match  37:37  28:35
Round  7:07  13:29
Time 0:04 0:44
Dummies: H 92:26 57:36
T 45:11 22:12
Constant 214:11 247:75
R2 0:38 0:52
Observations 183 435
Table 4: Linear regression for transaction prices on the listed variables. Data are clustered
by session and standard errors are robust. Time is measured in seconds.  signicant at
10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%.
between B and T markets cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level. Our two measures of
experience are both negatively correlated with the price for both 5 and 9-subject markets,
and in three out of four cases the measure is statistically signicant, if only at the 10 percent
level. The results are summarized in Table 4.
4.2 Vote Allocations
Table 5 summarizes the observed trades. We distinguish between a transaction a realized
trade between two subjectsand an orderan o¤er to sell or a bid to buy votes that may
or may not be realized. Note that both orders and transactions in principle may concern
multiple votes: on the purchasing side, it is clearly feasible to demand and buy multiple
units; on the selling side, although subjects enter the market endowed with a single vote,
they could resell in bulk votes they have purchased. For each committee size, the rst row is
the average number of transactions per two-minute trading round, in the di¤erent markets.
The transactions can be read as net trades because the percentage of reselling was in all
cases lower than 5%.17 As the table shows, the number of transactions is quite constant
across markets, and slightly higher than the theoretical prediction of 2 for n = 5; and 4 for
n = 9. Most transactions concerned individual votes (row 2) and indeed so did most orders
in general, not only those that were accepted (row 5). Most transactions also originated
from accepted o¤ers (row 3), and again most orders, whether accepted or not, were o¤ers to
17We dene speculation as the total number of votes that were both bought and sold by the same player.
Averaging across markets, it is 1 percent when n = 5 and 3 percent when n = 9 (there is no systematic e¤ect
across markets).
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LB LT HB HT Average
n = 5 No. Transactions 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3
% Unitary 83 95 96 96 92
% From O¤ers 77 58 66 72 68
No. Orders 5.8 5.8 4.4 6.8 5.7
% Unitary 94 94 92 92 93
% O¤ers 90 74 65 52 70
n = 9 No. Transactions 5.8 5.0 5.9 5.0 5.4
% Unitary 100 85 97 100 96
% From O¤ers 77 59 83 77 74
No. Orders 16.0 15.1 16.6 14.6 15.6
% Unitary 98 93 95 93 95
% O¤ers 83 67 62 62 69
Table 5: TransactionsSummary
sell, as opposed to bids to buy (row 6).
In order to describe how close the nal allocations of votes are to equilibrium, we dene
a distance measure d: for each market, d equals the minimal number of votes that would
have to be exchanged between subjects to move from the observed nal vote allocation
to an equilibrium vote allocation, averaged over di¤erent rounds and di¤erent sessions.18
To evaluate the meaning of specic d values, we compare them to the expected value of
d when the allocation of votes is random - i.e. when each individual vote is allocated to
each subject with equal probability. Calling such a measure rd, we construct a normalized
distance measure , dened as 1  d=rd, and ranging between 0 and 1.  equals 0 if d = rd,
and 1 if d = 0; thus  captures how much of the gap between the equilibrium allocation and
the random allocation is closed by the experimental data.
Table 6 summarizes the results. Range reports the minimum and maximum distance
observed across di¤erent rounds; and Upper Bound the maximal possible distance for each
market and committee size. The table shows two main regularities. First, data from markets
with valuations concentrated towards the bottom of the range tend to be closer to the
theoretical predictions; the concentration of votes in the hands of the two subjects with
18For example, consider a committee with ve members: n = 5. In equilibrium, members 4 and 5s
possible vote holdings are: 0 and 3; or 1 and 3; or 3 and 1. The remaining voters must have either 0 or
1 vote. Suppose that the nal vector of votes observed in the experiment were (0; 1; 0; 2; 2). In this case
d = 1, since we only need to transfer one vote from member 4 to member 5, or from member 5 to member
4. Suppose instead that the vector were (0; 1; 2; 2; 0). Now d = 2: we need to transfer 1 vote from member
3 to member 4 and another vote, either from member 2 or 3 to member 5.
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n = 5 n = 9
LB LT HB HT LB LT HB HT
Average d .4 1.05 .75 1.2 2.25 3.25 2.55 3.05
St Dev .49 .93 .54 .68 .89 .83 .67 1.29
Range [0,1] [0,3] [0,2] [0,3] [0,4] [1,5] [1,3] [2,7]
Upper Bound 4 4 4 4 8 8 8 8
Random: rd 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.77 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75
Normalized  .77 .41 .58 .32 .40 .13 .32 .19
Table 6: Summary statistics of distance from nal allocation of votes to equilibrium. Distance
between nal votesallocations and equilibrium prediction, its standard deviation and its
range (minimum and maximum observed). Normalized is equal to 1-(d/(rd)) where d is the
average distance to equilibrium and rd the distance to equilibrium from a random allocation
of votes. Upper Bound is the maximal possible distance.
highest valuations is naturally easier to achieve when the remaining voters are relatively
more willing to sell. Second, the smaller committee approaches the theoretical allocation
more closely than the larger committeethe value of  is consistently higher. But it is not
clear that this reects more awareness of equilibrium strategies: concentrating votes into few
hands is more easily achieved when the number of voters is small.
Contrary to prices, distance data show no evidence of learning: in ordered logit regressions
of d (or ) on dummies for market characteristics (H and T), and time variables (match and
round), for both committee sizes, none of the time dummies is statistically signicant, even
at the 10 percent level.19
Figure 5 plots the actual distribution of d (in white) in the data, and of rd (in black).
The horizontal axis reports possible distance values, from 0 to the theoretical maximum; the
vertical axis is the fraction of experimental rounds, per committee size and type of market,
whose nal allocation is at 0, 1, 2, etc. distance from the equilibrium. The distribution of rd,
the expected distance from equilibrium of the random vote allocation, is the average distrib-
ution obtained from 1,000,000 simulations and is invariant across markets. The distribution
of d is shifted to the left, relatively to the distribution of rd. Most of the d distribution is
concentrated on values 0 and 1 in the case of n = 5, and on values 2 and 3 in the case of
19Note that, for given committee size, rd is invariant across market types. Thus, for given n, d and  di¤er
by a constant only. In the logit regression, the market characteristics dummies are positive and signicant
at the 10 percent level if n = 5; if n = 9, the only signicant variable is the market T dummy, positive and
signicant at the 5 percent level. We report the regression in the Appendix, Table 10.
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Figure 5: Distribution of distances d to equilibrium from experimental and random vote
allocations.
n = 9.20
So far we have described the summary measure d without being explicit about the allo-
cation of votes across individual subjects. But di¤erent vote allocations can have identical
d, and yet quite di¤erent impacts on welfare. For instance, according to the theory the
behavior of voters 1 to n   2 should be identical. Therefore, the distance to equilibrium of
(3; 0; 0; 1; 1) and (0; 0; 3; 1; 1) is the samebut the expected welfare of the rst allocation is
substantially inferior to the second.
Figure 6 shows the average number of votes held by subjects at the end of each round,
compared to the equilibrium prediction. Subjects are ordered on the horizontal axis, from
lowest to highest valuation. Again, markets with valuations concentrated at the bottom of
the distributions (B) appear to conform to the theory relatively well: the highest valuation
subjects end the round with a large fraction of the votes. In particular, if the market is
LB, the distribution of votes across subjects does increase sharply for the highest valuation
subjects, exactly as the theory suggests, and this is true for both n = 9 and n = 5. But in
markets with valuations concentrated at the top of the distribution (T), the results deviate
from the theory: the highest valuation subjects demand fewer votes on average than their
equilibrium demand, and the number of votes held increases smoothly as the valuations
increase.
20Assuming independence, the chi-squared Goodness-of-Fit test rejects the hypothesis that the experimen-
tal data can be obtained from the random distribution at a signicance of at least 5% in all cases.
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Figure 6: Average amount of votes held by subjects at the end of the trading stage and
equilibrium (expected) allocation, ordered by valuation. The dotted line indicates no trade.
Market
n HB HT LB LT Average
5 55 45 100 65 66.25
9 25 5 20 0 12.50
Table 7: Observed precentage of rounds in which there was a dictator.
Finally, Table 7 shows the observed frequency of dictatorship for di¤erent markets and
di¤erent committee sizes. In n = 5 committees, dictatorship emerges two thirds of the time,
a frequency that although lower than the theoretical prediction of one hundred percent, we
still nd remarkable. In the LB market, the data do match the theory perfectly in this
regard: out of 20 rounds, in four di¤erent experimental sessions, all 20 result in dictatorship.
In n = 9 committees, where the purchase of four, as opposed to two, votes is required for
dictatorship, the results are much weaker, with an average frequency of dictatorship of 12
percent. In T markets, where valuations are concentrated at the top of the distribution,
competition among the higher-value subjects clearly works against the concentration of ve
votes in the hand of the same subject; in B markets, dictatorship does in fact occur, between
one fth and one fourth of the times, a weak result compared to the theory but still a
non-negligible frequency.
The probability of dictatorship increases with learning. A probit regression of the prob-
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Variable Coef
n = 5 Match 0:172 Obs 80
Round 0:195 Pr > chi2 :
Dummies: H  1:074 PseudoR2 0:195
T  0:795 LpL  41:19
n = 9 Match 0:406 Obs 80
Round 0:175 Pr > chi2 :
Dummies: H 0:320 PseudoR2 0:242
T  1:303 LpL  22:84
Table 8: Probit regression of the probability of a dictator as a function of match number,
round number, H and T dummies. Data are clustered by independent groups and standard
errors are robust.  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%.
ability of a dictator as function of market characteristics (H and T dummies), and time
dummies for round and match shows that the probability is signicantly higher in the last
round of each match if n = 5, or in the last match of each session if n = 9, with signicance
at the 1 percent level. In addition, as Table 7 shows, the probability is signicantly lower in
T markets, and, if n = 5, in H markets. The results are reported in Table 8.
4.3 Welfare
In this section we analyze the payo¤s obtained by our committees and compare them to the
equilibrium predictions and to the majority rule benchmark.
In theory, the equilibrium strategy is invariant to the direction of a voters preferences.
In the experiment, subjects participated in the market and submitted their orders without
information about othersrealized preferred alternative (or indeed about othersvaluations)
 all they knew was that any subject was assigned either alternative as preferred with
probability 1/2. Thus a voters trading behavior should be independent of both its own and
other votersrealized direction of preferences. When evaluating the welfare implications of
a specic vote allocation, the exact realization of the direction of preferences matters, but,
as we argued in section 2.5 the interesting welfare measure is the average welfare associated
with such an allocation, for all possible realizations of the directions of preferences. It is
such a measure that we calculate on the basis of the experimental data and present in Table
9.
For each prole of valuations and for each realized allocation of votes, we compute the
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average aggregate payo¤ for all possible proles of preferencesdirections, weighted by the
probability of their realization. For each prole of valuations, we then average the result
again, over all realized allocations of votes, and obtain WVM , our measure of experimental
payo¤s for each market. We compute the equivalent measure with majority voting, WMR 
that is, for each prole of valuations, for all possible realizations of preferencesdirections,
we resolve the disagreement in favor of the more numerous side; taking into account the
probability of each realization, we then compute the average aggregate payo¤. To ease the
comparison of payo¤s across the two institutions, the di¤erent markets, and the di¤erent
committee sizes, we express both WVM and WMR as share of the average maximum payo¤
that the subjects could appropriate, normalized by a oor given by the average minimum
possible payo¤. The average maximum payo¤, W , is calculated by selecting the alternative
favored by the side with higher aggregate valuation, for each realization of preferences; the
average minimum payo¤, W , corresponds to selecting the alternative favored by the side
with lower aggregate valuation. The welfare score then is: (WVM   W )=(W   W ), and
correspondingly for majority voting.
Table 9 displays the experimental welfare scores, aggregated over all rounds and all
matches, for each market and for either committee size, together with the theoretical predic-
tions, and the corresponding welfare scores with majority rule.21 The table highlights sev-
eral interesting regularities. First, realized welfare mimics equilibrium welfare more closely
in markets with low valuations, indeed very closely in three out of four cases. In markets
with high valuations, realized welfare is consistently higher than predicted welfare. Second,
Proposition 1 predicts that vote markets should perform better, relative to majority, when
valuations are concentrated at the bottom of the distributions. In particular, vote markets
should dominate majority in market LB, be slightly worse in market HB, and substantially
worse in markets LT and HT, for both committee sizes. In our data, vote markets had higher
average payo¤s than majority in both B treatments, although only barely in market HB.
In T treatments, where valuations are concentrated at the top of the distribution, majority
rule outperforms our experimental results, a conclusion that remains true even though, as
we saw, subjects deviated from equilibrium towards a more equalitarian allocation of votes,
and thus were closer to majority rule than theory predicts. Finally, realized welfare is always
(weakly) higher than equilibrium welfare, reecting a lower frequency of dictatorship than
21We consider all rounds and all matches because, as we saw in previous section, we do not nd signicant
temporal evolution in nal vote allocations.
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Market
LB LT HB HT
n = 5 Realized 0.93 0.88 0.93 0.90
Majority Rule 0.90 0.96 0.92 0.99
Equilibrium 0.92 0.88 0.90 0.85
n = 9 Realized 0.92 0.84 0.90 0.88
Majority Rule 0.87 0.95 0.89 0.97
Equilibrium 0.88 0.83 0.85 0.79
Table 9: Welfare scores in the experiment; in theory, and with simple majority rule.
predicted by theory.
5 Extensions
5.1 An Alternative Rationing Rule
The rationing rule plays a central role in guaranteeing existence and characterizing the ex
ante vote trading equilibrium. A reasonable concern then is that our theoretical results
could be quite special and disappear when using alternative rules. We show here that the
analysis is robust to the most plausible alternative. Consider the following rule, which we
call rationing-by-vote, or R2: If votersorders result in excess demand, any vote supplied
is randomly allocated to one of the individuals with outstanding purchasing orders, with
equal probability. An order remains outstanding until it has been completely lled. When
all supply is allocated, each individual who put in an order must purchase all units that have
been directed to him, even if the order is only partially lled. If there is excess supply, the
votes to be sold are chosen randomly from each seller, with equal probability.
As mentioned earlier, contrary to rationing-by-voter, or R1, rationing-by-vote guarantees
that the short side of the market is never rationed, but forces individuals to accept partially
lled orders. To illustrate the di¤erence, recall example 1 where three voters supply one
vote each, and two voters demand two votes each. Here, R1 rations one demander and one
supplier; with R2, no supplier is rationed, and the two voters demanding two votes each are
settled with two and one vote. Buying and paying for ones partial order when a di¤erent
voter exits the market holding a majority of votes is clearly suboptimal.
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Proposition 2 Suppose i =
1
2
, wi = 1, and mi = 0 8i, agents are risk neutral, and R2
is the rationing rule. Then there exist n and a nite threshold k (n)  1 such that for all
n  n and vn 1  k(n)vn 2 the following set of price and actions constitute an Ex Ante
Vote-Trading Equilibrium:
1. Price p = vn 1
2(n 1) .
2. Voters 1 to n  2 o¤er to sell their vote with probability 1.
3. Voter n demands n 1
2
votes with probability 1.
4. Voter n 1 o¤ers his vote with probability 2
n+1
, and demands n 1
2
votes with probability
n 1
n+1
.
Proof. See appendix.
In particular, 1.4. constitute an equilibrium if n  9 and vn 1  1:15vn 2, conditions
satised in our experimental treatments. Note that with risk neutrality the constraintmi = 0
8i is again irrelevant, and imposed for simplicity of notation only.
The equilibrium is almost identical to the equilibriumwithR1, with two di¤erences. First,
because orders can be lled partially, rationing can be particularly costly. In equilibrium, if
voter n   1 attempts to buy, either he or voter n will be required to pay for votes that are
strictly useless (since the other voter will hold a majority stake). To support voter n   1s
mixed strategy, the equilibrium price is lower than with the original rationing rule: vn 1
2(n 1)
instead of vn 1
n+1
. Second, and again because of the possibility of lling partial orders, lower
valuation voters can use their own orders strategically, refraining from selling to increase
the probability that no dictator emerges. To rule out the possibility of such a deviation,
the price must be high enough, relative to their valuation. This is the reason for requiring
vn 1  k(n)vn 2.
With these two caveats, the change in rationing rule has little e¤ect. In particular,
equilibrium vote trading results in dictatorship, and the welfare implications are similar.
5.2 Risk Aversion
So far we have assumed risk neutrality. A natural extension is to analyze how risk aversion
changes our results. The next proposition shows that the demands presented in Theorem 1
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can be supported as an equilibrium when all agents have CARA utility functions with the
same risk aversion parameter.
Proposition 3 Suppose i =
1
2
, wi = 1, and mi = 0 8i, u() =  e () with  > 0,
and R1 is the rationing rule. Then for all n there exists a nite threshold n  1 such
that if vn  nvn 1, the set of actions presented in Theorem 1 together with the price p =
2
r(n+1)
ln
 
1
2
+ 1
2
ervn 1

constitute an Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium.
Proof. See appendix.
The logic is virtually identical to the logic of Theorem 1. As in the case of risk neutrality,
the equilibrium price makes voter n 1 indi¤erent between selling and demanding a majority
of votes. Hence again the price is a function of vn 1. The e¤ect of higher risk aversion can
be seen in the implicit equation that denes p: The equation is valid for any utility function
and can be written as22: 1
2
u (p)+ 1
2
u (vn 1 + p) = u
 
vn 1   n 12 p

. As before, in equilibrium
voter n   1 is rationed with probability 1=2 whether his demand is  1 or n 1
2
; and if he is
rationed his utility is identical regardless of his demand. Thus the price p must be such that
the voter is indi¤erent between demanding  1 or n 1
2
when not rationed. The left-hand side
of the equation is the expected utility of demanding  1, conditional on not being rationed:
it is a lottery in which the voter receives p and vn 1+p with equal probability, depending on
whether voter n, who is dictator, agrees with voter n  1s preferred alternative. The right
hand side is the expected utility of demanding n 1
2
, conditional on not being rationed, and
thus equals u(vn 1  n 12 p) with certainty. Higher risk aversionmore concave u ()must lead
to an increase in the equilibrium price. The intuition is clear: xing the price, an increase
in risk aversion makes the riskier lottery of selling less attractive relatively to demanding a
majority of votes. In order to make voter n  1 indi¤erent, the price must be higher.
As in the case of Theorem 1, the equilibrium is supported if there is a su¢ cient gap
between the highest and the second highest valuation. But once again the required gap
is very small, indeed smaller than with risk neutrality in all numerical cases we studied.23
Figure 7 shows the minimum required gap with CARA utility, for the two cases of  = 1
(the dashed line) and  = 2 (the dotted line), and as reference for risk neutrality (the solid
line), as function of n. The minimum gap is always smaller than 1 percent if  = 1 and
22With CARA utility, the equation is solved by the equilibrium price in Proposition 3.
23A natural conjecture is that the gap condition is always easier to satisfy with risk aversion than with
risk neutrality.
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Figure 7: Minimum percentage gap with risk neutrality and with CARA utility funcion:
u (x) =  e x, with  = 1 and  = 2.
smaller than half a percent if  = 2, and disappears asymptotically as n increases. We have
veried numerically that the condition is satised by our experimental parameters for all
 2 (0; 1000].
Evidence for risk aversion has been documented in experiments across a broad spectrum
of environments, ranging from auctions to abstract games.24 We conjecture that it may be
a signicant factor in explaining the high prices we observe in our data. How much can
the price increase with risk aversion? The upper bound on the price increase is given by
an "innitely" risk averse agent, an agent uniquely motivated by the lowest payo¤ of the
lottery. Hence, the innitely risk averse agent will be indi¤erent whenever p = 2vn 1
n+1
: the
price with risk aversion lies between the risk neutral price and twice the risk neutral price.25
In our experiments prices generally fall at the upper end of this range. Given the broad
extent of overpricing in our data (with some transacted prices above 2vn 1
n+1
), risk aversion is
likely to play a role but other factors must be present too, suggesting an interesting question
for future research.
Figure 8 plots the equilibrium price with CARA relative to the price with risk neutrality
for n = 5 and n = 9. As the level of risk aversion increases, the ratio of the price to the
risk neutral price converges to 2. The gure suggests two further regularities. First, xing
24See for example Cox et al. (1988), Goeree et al. (2002), and Goeree et al. (2003).
25Indeed, lim!1 2(n+1) ln

1+evn 1
2

= 2vn 1n+1 . But the result holds not only with CARA, but for all
concave u().
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Figure 8: Equilibrium price with CARA utility function, relative to the equilibrium price
with risk neutrality. The two lines correspond to di¤erent number of voters.
the level of risk aversion, an increase in committee size induces an increase in the relative
equilibrium price. Second, relatively low levels of risk aversion translate into large increases
in the price. In the case of n = 5,  = 1 (= 2) implies a 40% (60%) increment of the
equilibrium price with respect to the risk neutral benchmark.
6 Conclusions
This paper proposes and tests a competitive equilibrium to study allocations resulting from
a market for votes. Vote markets are unique and have properties that require a non-standard
approach. Votes have no intrinsic value, they are lumpy, and acquiring votes simply increases
the probability of creating a good public outcome from the standpoint of the buyer. And
because individuals disagree about what a "good" public outcome is, buying and selling votes
create externalities. We dene the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, a concept
that combines the standard price-taking assumption of competitive equilibrium in a market
for goods with less standard assumptions: demands are best responses to the demands of the
other traders, mixed demands are allowed, and market clearing is achieved by a rationing
rule. Using a constructive proof, we establish su¢ cient conditions for existence of an ex
ante equilibrium, in a vote market where voters have incomplete information about other
memberspreferences and a single binary decision has to be made, and we characterize the
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properties of this equilibrium.
A striking feature of the equilibrium vote allocation is that there always is a dictator:
with probability one a single trader acquires a majority position. This feature pins down
the welfare properties of the vote market. Because the market results in a dictator, and
because the dictator must be one of the two highest valuation (or intensity) voters, the
welfare e¤ects depend on the distribution of valuations and on the size of the electorate or
committee. When the number of voters is large, the market creates ine¢ ciencies relative to
simple majority voting. On average, e¢ ciency is higher if the outcome reects that median
preference rather than the preference of the dictator, even if he is the voter with highest
intensity. Put another way, as n gets larger, the externality problem becomes worse  in
particular it creates more ine¢ ciency than the failure of majority rule to reect intensity
of preferences. In small committees, the e¢ ciency result depends on the distribution of
valuations: the externality problem is relatively small, and a market for votes may enhance
e¢ ciency, as long as there is a su¢ ciently large di¤erence between the highest valuation and
the average valuation of the n  2 lowest-valuation voters.
The theoretical ndings are examined using data from laboratory market experiments
with ve and nine person committees, where the vote market was conducted as a continuous
multi-unit double auction. By varying the distribution of valuations and the number of
traders/voters, we controlled the predicted outcomes. In line with the ex ante competitive
equilibrium, prices were higher in smaller committees and in treatments where valuations
were higher. Furthermore, prices did not vary systematically with valuations, once the top
two valuations were xed. With one exception, experimental prices were signicantly higher
than risk neutral equilibrium prices, albeit with signicant downward convergence. We show
that one explanation of the observed overpricing is risk aversion. If traders are risk averse,
risk neutral pricing is only a lower bound, and the equilibrium price can be as high as double
the risk neutral equilibrium price.
Observed vote allocations were close to equilibrium allocations, particularly in the B
treatments where the two top valuations were signicantly higher than the remainder. In
smaller committees, such treatments resulted in dictatorship more than three quarters of
the times, on average. In larger committees, where the purchase of four votes is required for
dictatorship, the frequency of dictatorship was lower, but dictatorship still arose between one
fourth and one fth of the times when the discrepancy between the top two valuations and
the others was large. The welfare results matched the theory: average experimental payo¤s
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were higher than majority voting payo¤s would have been, with the set of experimental
valuations, when the discrepancy between top valuations and all others was large, and were
lower otherwise.
There are still many open questions about vote markets, and in our experiment we explore
only the simplest environment. A key direction of future research is to extend the model to
multiple issues. Here we consider only a one-issue vote market, but in principle the same
approach can be applied to the more general case of committees that vote on multiple issues,
such as legislatures, boards, and standing committees. With multiple issues, the model will
then be able to address questions of vote trading where the market e¤ectively becomes a
means for a voter to accumulate votes on issues he cares most about in exchange for his
vote on issues he cares less about. The welfare properties of multi-issue vote markets are
likely to be more complicated to analyze, and unclear. Extrapolating from our ndings
suggests signicant ine¢ ciencies, as found in other models of vote exchange that focus on
simple bartering examples (Riker and Brams, 1971), rather than taking a general equilibrium
approach as we do here. On the other hand, ine¢ ciencies might be somewhat mitigated by
the presence of multiple issues, and the more numerous possibilities for gains from trade, as
in recent models of mechanisms that link decisions across multiple dimensions (Jackson and
Sonnenschein, 2007, Casella, 2005, Hortala-Vallve, 2007).
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Appendix I
Proofs
Theorem 1. Suppose i =
1
2
, wi = 1, and mi = 0 8i, agents are risk neutral, and R1 is the
rationing rule. Then for all n there exists a nite threshold n  1 such that if vn  nvn 1,
the following set of price and actions constitute an Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium:
1. Price p = vn 1
n+1
.
2. Voters 1 to n  2 o¤er to sell their vote with probability 1.
3. Voter n demands n 1
2
votes with probability 1.
4. Voter n   1 o¤ers to sell his vote with probability 2
n+1
, and demands n 1
2
votes with
probability n 1
n+1
.
Proof. Voter n  1. If voter n   1 sells, the total supply of votes is n   1 votes. Voter
n demands n 1
2
votes. Thus total demand equals n 1
2
, and voter n   1s probability of
being rationed is equal to 1
2
. Therefore, Un 1( 1) = 1
2
vn 1 + 12p. On the other hand, if
voter n   1 demands n 1
2
, he is again rationed with probability 1
2
, and his expected utility
is Un 1(n 1
2
) = 3
4
vn 1   n 14 p. The price that makes him indi¤erent is exactly p = vn 1n+1 .
Demanding other quantities is strictly dominated: a smaller quantity can be accommodated
with no rationing, but voter n   1 would pay the units demanded, and voter n, with a
majority, would always decide; a larger quantity is equivalent if n   1 is rationed, but is
costly and redundant if n  1 is not rationed.
Voters 1;2; :::;n  2. Buying votes can only be advantageous if it can prevent both
voter n  1 and voter n from becoming dictator, but a demand of more than n 1
2
is always
dominated. Thus the only positive demands to consider are n 1
2
  1 or n 1
2
votes. In the
proposed equilibrium, for any i 2 f1; :::; n  2g
U i( 1) = 1
2
vi +
n2   3
2 (n  2) (n+ 1)p (3)
U i(
n  1
2
) =
4n+5
6(n+1)
vi   n2+n 26(n+1) p if n > 3
3
4
v1   14p if n = 3
(4)
U i(
n  3
2
) =
n+2+(n 1)n
3(n+1)
vi   (n 3)(n+5)6(n+1) p if n > 3
5
8
v1 if n = 3
(5)
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where n = 1   1
2
n+1
2 . It is easy to see that selling dominates in the case of n = 3. In
the case of n > 3, 3 is bigger than 4 whenever vn 1
vi
 n2 4
n2+n 5 , which holds for any positive
n. On the other hand 3 is bigger than 5 whenever vn 1
vi
 (n2 1)(n 2)(2n 1)
n3+3n2 19n+21 , which also holds
for any positive n (see that 2n   1 < 1).
Voter n. In the proposed equilibrium, the expected utilities to voter n from demanding
a majority of votes or from deviating and ordering g votes less are given by:
Un(
n  1
2
) =
3n+ 5
4 (n+ 1)
vn   n
2 + 2n  3
4 (n+ 1)
p (6)
Un(
n  1
2
  g) = n  1 + 4
n (g)
2 (n+ 1)
vn  

n  1
2
  g

p (7)
where n (g) =
Pn 1
2
+g
ig
 n 1
2
+g
i
   1
2
n 1
2
+g
. 6 will be bigger than 7 whenever the following
inequality holds:
g + 2  n (g)  n
2 + 3n+ 4
2 (n+ 1)
The left hand side is increasing in g, and therefore reaches its maximum at g = n 1
2
, that is,
when voter n does not buy a vote at all. We need to show that
n

n  1
2

 1
4
3n+ 5
n+ 1
The inequality holds for any n since n
 
n 1
2
  3
4
.
Finally, the expected utility to voter n from selling his vote is given by:
Un( 1) = n  1
n+ 1
1
2
[vn + p] +
2
n+ 1

1
2
+

n  1
n 1
2

2 n

:
Thus Un( 1)  Un(n 1
2
) whenever
vn
vn 1
 (n  1) (n+ 5)
(n+ 1)

n+ 3   n 1n 1
2

2 (n 3)

Thus the Theorem holds with (n) = (n 1)(n+5)
(n+1)

n+3 (n 1n 1
2
)2 (n 3)
 :
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Proposition 1. Fix n and a prole of valuations v with some vn; vn 1; and vn 2 > 0,
and such that vn  nvn 1. Then there always exists a nite n(vn; vn 1; vn 2) such that if
n > n, WVM < WMR.
Proof. Comparing equations 1 and 2, we can write:
WMR  WVM () vn 2
vn
  n + !n
vn 1
vn
where  n =
n+3
4(n+1)(n 2)n  
1
n 2 , !n =
n 1
4(n+1)(n 2)n  
1
n 2 and n =
 
n 1
n 1
2

2 n. The
coe¢ cient  n reaches its maximum at n = 3, decreases at higher n, and converges to zero as
n !1. The coe¢ cient !n is negative for n  5, reaches its maximum at n = 17, decreases
at higher n, and converges to zero as n !1. Thus  n + !n vn 1vn converges to 0 in n, and as
long as vn 2=vn > 0, the Proposition follows.
Proposition 2. Suppose i =
1
2
, wi = 1, and mi = 0 8i, agents are risk neutral, and
R2 is the rationing rule. Then there exist n and a nite threshold k (n)  1 such that for
all n  n and vn 1  k(n)vn 2 the following set of price and actions constitute an Ex Ante
Vote-Trading Equilibrium:
1. Price p = vn 1
2(n 1) .
2. Voters 1 to n  2 o¤er to sell their vote with probability 1.
3. Voter n demands n 1
2
votes with probability 1.
4. Voter n 1 o¤ers his vote with probability 2
n+1
, and demands n 1
2
votes with probability
n 1
n+1
.
In particular, 14 constitute an equilibrium if n  9 and vn 1  1:15vn 2. The latter
condition is satised in our experimental treatments; it is a su¢ cient condition for n < 9,
and it is necessary and su¢ cient for n = 9.
Proof. If n = 3, in equilibrium R2 is identical to R1, and Theorem 1 1 applies here.
immediately. The proof considers n > 3.
Voter n  1. In the candidate equilibrium, he has expected utility Un 1( 1) = 1=2(p+
vn 1=2) + 1=2(vn 1=2) = vn 1=2 + p=2. (a) Demanding a number of votes x 2 (0; (n  1)=2)
cannot be a protable deviation. Any such demand is satised with probability 1, causing
an expenditure of px > 0 while leaving the probability of obtaining the desired outcome at
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1=2, and thus results in expected utility Un 1(x) = vn 1=2  px. (b) Demanding more than
(n 1)=2 votes cannot be a protable deviation: as long as voter n 1 has received less than
(n  1)=2 votes, n  1s order is outstanding whether his demand is (n  1)=2 or higher - and
thus the deviation does not a¤ect the probability of individual n being rationed; once voter
n 1 has received (n 1)=2 votes, he controls the nal outcome, and any further expenditure
is wasted. (c) Finally, doing nothing (Un 1(0) = vn 1=2) is dominated by o¤ering to sell.
Voter n. (a) Doing nothing is again dominated by selling: it is identical to selling if
n  1 sells, and it is strictly dominated if n  1 buys. (b) Selling is dominated by demanding
(n   1)=2 votes. If n   1 o¤ers to buy, then n must prefer demanding (n   1)=2 to selling
because in the identical circumstance, n   1, with smaller valuation, is indi¤erent between
the two options. If n   1 o¤ers to sell, again n must prefer to buy (n   1)=2: when n   1
sells, buying yields expected utility vn  (n 1)=2p, while o¤ering to sell means that no trade
takes place (all voters try to sell) and n wins with probability  Pn 1k=(n 1)=2  n 1k (1=2)n 1
(the probability that at least (n   1)=2 of the other voters agree with him). But  is
declining in n, and thus is maximal at n = 3, where it equals 3=4. Hence when n   1 sells,
ns expected utility from o¤ering to sell has upper bound (3=4)vn. But vn  (n   1)=2p =
vn   vn 1=4 > (3=4)vn for all vn > vn 1. Hence the only deviation to consider is demanding
a quantity of votes x di¤erent from (n   1)=2. (c) Demanding a quantity x larger than
(n   1)=2 cannot be protable. If voter n   1 is selling, the order will be lled and is less
protable than demanding (n   1)=2; if voter n   1 is buying, the argument is identical
to point 1b above. (d) Demanding a quantity x smaller than (n   1)=2 is not a protable
deviation either. In the candidate equilibrium n has expected utility equal to:
Un

n  1
2

=

2
n+ 1

(vn   pn  1
2
)+
+

n  1
n+ 1

1
2

vn=2  pn  3
2

+
1
2

vn   pn  1
2

=
=
vn(5 + 3n)  nvn 1
4(n+ 1)
where the second expression is obtained by substituting for p. If n o¤ers to buy x < (n 1)=2,
his demand is always satised. His expected utility is vn=2   px if n   1 is buying, and
(x)vn   px if n   1 is o¤ering to sell, where (x) 
Pn 1 x
k=(n 1)=2 x
 
n 1 x
k

(1=2)n 1 x is the
probability that n obtains his preferred outcome when owning x + 1 votes (while everyone
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else has one vote). Thus:
Un(x) =

2
n+ 1

((x)vn   px) +

n  1
n+ 1

(vn=2  px)
With x < (n  1)=2, the di¤erence Un  n 1
2
 Un(x) is minimal when p is highest, i.e when
vn 1 = vn. But:
Un

n  1
2

jvn 1=vn =
5 + 2n
4(n+ 1)
Un(x)jvn 1=vn = (1=2)

n  1 + 4(x)
n+ 1
  x
n  1

It then follows immediately that Un
 
n 1
2
 jvn 1=vn > Un(x)jvn 1=vn for all x > 0 and all
(x)  1. Hence Un  n 1
2

> Un(x): deviation is not advantageous.
Voters 1;2; :::;n  2. (a) One possible deviation is for voter i 2 f1; ::; n   2g to do
nothing. When voter n  1 demands (n  1)=2 votes, supply is n  3 and it is then possible
for neither n   1 nor n to be dictator. Call re(n) the probability that votes supplied are
allocated equally to n and n  1, when n  1 demands (n  1)=2 votes. I.e.:
re(n) =

n  3
(n  3)=2

(1=2)n 3: (8)
Then is expected utility from doing nothing, U0i , is given by:
U i(0) =
2
n+ 1
vi
2

+
n  1
n+ 1

(1  re(n))vi
2
+ re(n)
3
4
vi

: (9)
Voter is expected utility from selling, U i( 1), is:
U i( 1) = 2
n+ 1
vi
2
+
p
2

+
n  1
n+ 1
vi
2
+ p

(10)
Comparing (9) to (10) and substituting (8), we derive;
U i( 1)  U i(0)() (11)
vn 1
vi
 (n  1)
2
n

n  3
(n  3)=2

(1=2)n 2
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The right hand side of equation (11) is smaller than 1 for all n < 9, and equals 10=9 at
n = 9. Thus deviation to doing nothing is never advantageous for any i at n = 5 or 7; at
n = 9, we need to impose vn 1  (10=9)vn 2. It will be shown below that this is not the
binding restriction. However:
lim
n >1
(n  1)2
n

n  3
(n  3)=2

(1=2)n 2 =1
Thus unless vi = 0 for all i < n   1, there must always exist a number n such that for all
n > n voter n  2 prefers to do nothing than selling. The actions and price described in the
Proposition can only be an equilibrium for n  n.
(b) The other possible deviation for voter i is demanding a positive number of votes x,
with x 2 f1; 2; ::; (n   1)=2g. As before, demanding more than (n   1)=2 votes is never
advantageous. Consider rst is expected utility from demanding (n   1)=2 votes. Call
i(n; xn 1) the probability that i becomes the dictator, i.e. the probability that he obtains
(n  1)=2 votes, as function of n and of voter n  1s demand, xn 1. When n  1 demands
(n   1)=2 votes, the total supply of votes is n   3, and i(n; (n   1)=2) is the probability
that at least (n  1)=2 votes are randomly allocated to voter i:
i(n; (n  1)=2) =
n 3X
i=(n 1)=2
n 3 iX
z=0
(n  3)!
i!z!(n  3  z   i)!(1=3)
n 3
Similarly,  i(n; (n   1)=2)) is the probability that either n or n   1 become dictator, i.e.
the probability that at least (n  1)=2 votes are randomly allocated to one of them:
 i(n; (n  1)=2) = 2
n 3X
z=(N 1)=2
n 3 zX
y=0
(n  3)!
z!y!(n  3  z   y)!(1=3)
n 3
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Thus is expected utility, when n   1 demands (n   1)=2 votes, either n or n   1 become
dictator and i demands xi = (n  1)=2 votes is given by:
Zid( i)

n  1
2

= 2
n 3X
z=(n 1)=2
n 3 zX
y=0
(n  3)!
z!y!(n  3  z   y)!(1=3)
n 3
24v
2
  p
0@n  3  z   y + z (n 1)=2X
i=1

z   (n  1)=2
i

i(1=2)z (n 1)=2
1A35
Finally, there is the probability that no dictator arises:
1  i    i =
(n 3)=2X
z=0
(n 3)=2X
y=(n 3)=2 z
(n  3)!
z!y!(n  3  z   y)!(1=3)
n 3
and the corresponding expected utility:
Zinod

n  1
2

=
(n 3)=2X
z=0
(n 3)=2X
y=(n 3)=2 z
(n  3)!
z!y!(n  3  z   y)!(1=3)
n 3

3v
4
  p(n  3  z   y)

We can then write:
U i

n  1
2

=
n  1
n+ 1

Zid( i)

n  1
2

+ Zinod

n  1
2

+ i

v   n  1
2
p

+
2
n+ 1

1
2

v   n  1
2
p

+
1
2

v
2
  n  3
2
p

Comparing U i
 
n 1
2

to is expected utility from selling, and substituting p, we nd that
U i( 1)  U i  n 1
2

for all i < n   1 if and only if: vn 1  (25=24)vn 2, if n = 5; vn 1 
(11=10)vn 2, if n = 7; and vn 1  1:15vn 2, if n = 9.
(c) For n > 3, demanding less than (n   1)=2 votes can in principle be advantageous if
n 1 demands (n 1)=2 votes, and neither n 1 nor n emerge as dictators. The calculations
are somewhat cumbersome, but follow the logic just described, and we do not report them
here (they are available from the authors upon demand). They show: (1) U i( 1)  U i  n 3
2

for all i as long as vn 1  vn 2, satised by denition. For n = 5, this concludes the proof.
(2) U i( 1)  U i  n 5
2

for all i as long as vn 1  vn 2, satised by denition. For n = 7, this
completes the proof. (3) For n = 9, U i( 1)  U i  n 7
2

for all i as long as vn 1  1:04vn 2.
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The condition is not binding, because vn 1  1:15vn 2 is required to prevent n 2 to deviate
to doing nothing.
Summarizing the conditions derived in (a), (b) and (c), we conclude that the actions
and price described in the proposition are an equilibrium for n = 5 if and only if vn 1 
(25=24)vn 2; for n = 7, if and only if vn 1  (11=10)vn 2; and for n = 9, if and only if
vn 1  1:15vn 2. With 1:15 > 11=10 > 25=24, the latter condition is su¢ cient for n = 3; 5; 7
and necessary and su¢ cient for n = 9. This is the statement in the Proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose i =
1
2
, wi = 1, and mi = 0 8i, u() =  e () with  > 0,
and R1 is the rationing rule. Then for all n there exists a nite threshold n  1 such
that if vn  nvn 1, the set of actions presented in Theorem 1 together with the price
p = 2
r(n+1)
ln
 
1
2
+ 1
2
ervn 1

constitute an Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium.
Proof. Voter n  1. As in Theorem 1, p must be such that individual n  1 is indi¤erent
between selling his vote or demanding a majority of votes. If voter n   1 o¤ers to sell his
vote, he is rationed with probability 1=2; whether he is rationed or not, the decision is made
by voter n, who owns a majority of votes and agrees with voter n  1 with probability 1=2.
Thus:
Un 1( 1) = 1
4
(u(0) + u(vn 1) + u(p) + u(vn 1 + p)
If voter n   1 demands n 1
2
votes, he is again rationed withe probability 1=2; if he is not
rationed, he is dictator, if he is rationed, the dictator is voter n who agrees with n  1 with
probability 1=2. Hence:
Un 1

n  1
2

=
1
4
(u(0) + u(vn 1)) +
1
2
u

vn 1   n  1
2
p

:
Thus the price at which n  1 is indi¤erent must solve:
u (p) + u (vn 1 + p) = 2  u

vn 1   n  1
2
p

(12)
In the case of a CARA utility, the price that makes voter n  1 indi¤erent is computable
and equal to p = 2
(n+1)
ln
 
1
2
+ 1
2
evn 1

.
As in Theorem 1, demanding other quantities is strictly dominated because it is either
equivalent to demanding
 
n 1
2

if voter n  1 is rationed, or strictly worse, if he is not.
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Voter n. In equilibrium, voter ns expected utility from demanding
 
n 1
2

votes, is given
by:
Un

n  1
2

=
2
n+ 1
u

vn   n  1
2
p

+
+
n  1
2(n+ 1)

1
2
u(0) +
1
2
u(vn) + u

vn   n  1
2
p

If voter n deviates and o¤ers his vote for sale, his expected utility is
Un ( 1) = 2
n+ 1

n

n  1
2

u(vn) +

1  n

n  1
2

u(0)

+
+
n  1
2(n+ 1)

1
2
u(0) +
1
2
u(vn) +
1
2
u(p) + u(vn + p)

where, as dened earlier, n
 
n 1
2

=
Pn 1
i=(n 1)=2
 
n 1
i
   1
2
n 1
is the probability that at least
n 1
2
other voters agree with him, in the event that no trade has occurred.
Finally, if voter n deviates and demands
 
n 1
2
  g votes, his expected utility is:
Un

n  1
2
  g

=

2
n+ 1
n(g) +
n  1
2(n+ 1)

u

vn  

n  1
2
  g

p

+
+

2
n+ 1
(1  n(g)) + n  1
2(n+ 1)

u

 

n  1
2
  g

p

where again n (g) =
Pn 1
2
+g
ig
 n 1
2
+g
i
  1
2
n 1
2
+g
is the probability that at least g other voters
agree with him, when voter n  1 has o¤ered his vote for sale and n 1
2
+ g voters in all retain
their vote.
All three expected utilities are continuous in p; Un
 
n 1
2

and Un
 
n 1
2
  g are every-
where strictly decreasing in p, Un ( 1) is everywhere strictly increasing in p Notice that
at p = 0 (and thus vn 1 = 0), Un
 
n 1
2
 jp=0 > Un ( 1) jp=0, because n  n 12  < 1, and
Un
 
n 1
2
 jp=0 > Un  n 12   g jp=0, because Un  n 12   g jp=0 is increasing in n(g) and n(g)
is maximal at g = 0. Thus for any vn Un
 
n 1
2

> Un ( 1) and Un  n 1
2

> Un
 
n 1
2
  g if
vn 1 (and thus p) is su¢ ciently low. Equivalently there must exist a value n such that if
vn  nvn 1, Un
 
n 1
2

> Un ( 1) and Un  n 1
2

> Un
 
n 1
2
  g. This is the gap identied
in the Proposition.
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Voters 1;2; :::;n  2. As in Theorem 1, for voter i 2 f1; :::; n  2g deviation can be
protable only if he demands n 1
2
 1 or n 1
2
votes. (1) Consider rst deviation to demanding
n 1
2
votes. If n > 3, the possible outcomes and their probabilities are represented in the
following Table:
O¤er Demand n 1
2
Votes
Outcome Prob Outcome Prob
0 1 
2
0 1 "
2
p 1
2

vi
1 
2
vi n 12 p "
vi + p
1
2
 vi
1 "
2
where we dene  = 1
n+1
+ (n 1)
2
2(n+1)(n 2) and " =
n+2
3(n+1)
. Thus:
U i( 1) > U i

n  1
2

()
  [u (p) + u (vi + p)]  2"  u

vi n  1
2
p

(13)
+(   ")  [u (vi) + u (0)]
Note that vi  vn 1. At vi = vn 1, given equation (12), the fact that u () is increasing
and the fact that  > ", equation (13) holds with strict inequality. We can show that if
equation (13) holds at vi = vn 1, it must hold at all vi < vn 1. Denote:
 =   [u (p) + u (vi + p)]  2"  u

vi n  1
2
p

  (   ")  [u (vi) + u (0)]
Then
@
@v
=   [u0 (vi + p)  u0 (vi)]  " 

2  u0

vi n  1
2
p

  u0 (vi)

But the concavity of u then implies @
@v
< 0 , and the result is established.
If n = 3, selling is preferred to buying one vote if 2u(p)+ 2u(v+ p)  3u(v)+u(0). Note
rst that because 2u0(v + p)  3u0(v) < 0 by concavity, we only need to check the condition
at v = vn 1. Using the specic functional form of CARA utility simplies the rest of the
proof. Recall that the price is given by p = 1
2
ln
 
1+evn 1
2

. Hence, e p =
 
2
1+evn 1
 1
2 and
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e (v+p) =
 
2
1+evn 1
 1
2 e v. The inequality that we need to verify reduces to
2
p
2 (1 + evn 1)
1
2  evn 1 + 3
Dene x = 1+ evn 1. Then, we want to show that 2
p
2
p
x  2+ x. But 2+ x  2p2px
has a minimum at x = 2, which is 0. Hence, the condition is always satised.
(2) We now show that if n > 3, selling ones vote dominates demanding n 3
2
votes. If
n > 3, the di¤erence of utilities is given by:
Uk( 1)  Uk(n  3
2
) =   n
2   6n+ 11
12(n+ 1)(n  2)(u(vk) + u(0)) (14)
+
n2   3
4(n+ 1)(n  2)(u(p) + u(vk + p))
 
"
n  1
3(n+ 1)

1
2
n+1
2
#
u

 n  3
2
p

 
"
n  1
3(n+ 1)
 
1 

1
2
n+1
2
!#
u

vk   n  3
2
p

  1
n+ 1

u

vk   n  3
2
p

+ u

 n  3
2
p

It is somewhat cumbersome but not di¢ cult to show that the expression is decreasing
in v.26 Hence it is minimal at v = vn 1; if 14 is positive then, it is positive for all vk 
vn 1. Again, we make use of the CARA functional form. Dene  = 1+e
vn 1
2
so that
p = 2
(n+1)
ln (). Thus:
e p =  
2
n+1 e (v+p) = e v 
2
n+1
e
n 3
2
p = 
n 3
n+1 e (v 
n 3
2
p) = e v
n 3
n+1
26The proof is available upon request.
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Substituting in equation 14, we can write:
evn 1(Uk( 1)  Uk(n  3
2
)) =
n2   6n+ 11
12(n+ 1)(n  2)(1 + e
vn 1)
  n
2   3
4(n+ 1)(n  2)
  2
n+1 (1 + evn 1)
+
"
n  1
3(n+ 1)

1
2
n+1
2
#
evn 1
n 3
n+1
+
"
n  1
3(n+ 1)
 
1 

1
2
n+1
2
!#

n 3
n+1
+
1
n+ 1

n 3
n+1 (1 + evn 1)
First, because evn 1  1, it is su¢ cient to show that
 =
n2   6n+ 11
12(n+ 1)(n  2)(1 + e
vn 1)  n
2   3
4(n+ 1)(n  2)
  2
n+1 (1 + evn 1)
+
n  1
3(n+ 1)

n 3
n+1
+
1
n+ 1

n 3
n+1 (1 + evn 1)
is positive. Note that 1 + evn 1 = 2. Hence, we can write
 =

n 3
n+1
n+ 1

n2   6n+ 11
6(n  2) 
4
n+1   n
2   3
2(n  2)
2
n+1 +
n  1
3
+ 2

Denote   = n
2 6n+11
6(n 2) 
4
n+1   n2 3
2(n 2)
2
n+1 + n 1
3
+ 2. We want to show that    0.
Note that
@ 
@
= 2(
n2   6n+ 11
3(n+ 1)(n  2))
3 n
n+1   n
2   3
(n+ 1)(n  2)
1 n
n+1 + 2
@2 
@2
= 2(
(3  n)(n2   6n+ 11)
3(n+ 1)2(n  2) )
2(1 n)
n+1   (1  n)(n
2   3)
(n+ 1)2(n  2)
 2n
n+1
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Therefore,
@2 
@2
 0 , 2(n2   6n+ 11) 2n+1  3(n  1)(n+ 3)
,    =

3(n  1)(n+ 3)
2(n2   6n+ 11)
n+1
2
(> 1)
Note that by construction,  2 [1;+1]. Hence, @ 
@
has a maximum at . But:
@ 
@ j=1
=
5n2   18n+ 19
3(n+ 1)(n  2)
which is always positive for n  3. Moreover, as !1, we can see that for n > 3,
@ 
@
!1 2
n+ 1
> 0
Therefore, @ 
@
 0 for any n and . Hence, we only need to show that at  = 1,    0.
But  j=1 = 0. Thus:    0, which implies   0, which implies Uk( 1)   Uk(n 32 )  0,
concluding the proof for n > 3.
Finally, we need to show that demanding n 3
2
is also dominated when n = 3, a condition
that amounts to showing 3u(v+ p)  4u(v)  2u(0)+3u(p)  0. But 3u0(v+ p)  4u0(v)  0,
and thus we only need to check the inequality at v = vn 1. Redening  = 1+e
rvn 1
2
, the
condition becomes  6 + 2p + 4p  0. The RHS is increasing in  and is 0 at  = 1.
Hence, it is always satised.
51
Statistical Analysis of the Final Vote Allocations Distance to Equi-
librium
Variable Coef
n = 5 Match  0:025 Obs 80
Round  0:184 Pr > chi2 0:029
Dummies: H 0:501 PseudoR2 0:114
T 0:948 LpL  74:64
n = 9 Match  0:141 Obs 80
Round 0:010 Pr > chi2 0:065
Dummies: H  0:006 PseudoR2 0:062
T 0:862 LpL  102:69
Table 10: Ordered probit regression of distance to equilibrium d as a function of the number
of a match, the number of a round, a dummy that takes value one if there are high values,
H, and a dummy that takes value one if values are concentrated on the top, T. Data is
clustered by session and standard errors are robust.  signicant at 10%;  signicant at
5%;  signicant at 1%.
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Appendix II (Not for publication)
Sample Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this decision making experiment. During the
experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention, and ask that you follow in-
structions carefully. You may not open other applications on your computer, chat with other
students, or engage in other distracting activities, such as using your phone, reading books,
etc.
You will be paid for your participation in cash, at the end of the experiment. Di¤erent
participants may earn di¤erent amounts. What you earn depends partly on your decisions,
partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction
between you will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk or in
any way try to communicate with other participants during the experiments.
During the instruction period, you will be given a complete description of the ex-
periment and will be shown how to use the computers. If you have any questions during the
instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be answered out loud so everyone
can hear. If you have any questions after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, and
an experimenter will come and assist you.
The experiment you are participating in is a committee voting experiment, where you
will have an opportunity to buy and sell votes before voting on an outcome.
At the end of the experiment you will be paid the sum of what you have earned, plus a
show-up fee of $10.00. Everyone will be paid in private and you are under no obligation to
tell others how much you earned. Your earnings during the experiment are denominated in
POINTS. Your DOLLAR earnings are determined by dividing your earnings in POINTS by
350, that is, for every 350 POINTS you get 1 DOLLAR.
In this experiment you will be in a 5 member committee to decide on an outcome, X or
Y. Each of you will be randomly assigned with probability 1/2 to be either in favor of X or
in favor of Y. You will be told which outcome you favor, but will not be told the outcome
favored by anyone else. You will also be assigned a Value, which you will earn if and only if
your preferred outcome is the committee decision. If the opposite outcome is the committee
decision you do not earn your value. Values will be di¤erent for di¤erent members. All
values are integers between 1 and 1000 points.
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Committee decisions are made by majority rule. Outcome X is the committee decision
if there are more votes for X than for Y and vice versa.
Every round consists of two stages. Each committee member starts the round with one
vote. After being told your value, but before voting, there will be a 2 minute trading stage,
during which you and the other members of your committee will have an opportunity to buy
or sell votes. We will describe how trading occurs momentarily.
After the trading stage ends, we proceed to the voting stage. In this stage you do not
really have any choice. You will simply be asked to click a button to cast all your votes, if
you have any, for your preferred outcome.
We will repeat this procedure for a set of 5 rounds, each consisting of the same two stages,
trading and voting, described above. This set of ve rounds is called a match. During each
round of the match each of you keep the same Value you were assigned in round 1 of the
match, but you will be randomly assigned to be in favor of X or Y (with each equally likely).
Therefore, your preferred outcome can change from round to round. At the end of the fth
round of the match, a second match of 5 rounds will begin. In this new match, and you will
be assigned a di¤erent Value, which you will keep for each of the 5 rounds in the second
match. The experiment consists of 4 matches of 5 rounds each.
[SCREEN 1]
When we begin the experiment, you will see a screen like this. Your Subject ID# is
printed at the very top left of your screen, and remains the same throughout the whole
experiment.
The current match number, round number, your value, and your preferred outcome are
displayed below your subject ID in the left part of the screen. The match number and round
number are both equal to 1 now, indicating that this is the rst election in your committee.
Notice that this is an example where member 3s preferred outcome is X and his value 13.
The committee number will identify you during the trading stage, and will be the same for
the di¤erent rounds of a same match, and di¤erent between matches.
The middle panel is the trading window. Just above the panel, there is your cash holdings.
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be loaned an initial amount of cash of 10.000
points, which will not be included in your nal earnings. In the right part of the panel there
is a table that claries how many votes each member of the committee currently has. Your
information is highlighted and the other membersinformation is not. Notice that you do
not see the values of the other members.
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As the experiment proceeds, your cash holdings will be updated to reect any earnings
you make. It increases when you sell votes or when you earn your value as a result of the
voting. It decreases when you buy votes. At the top of the panel, there is a countdown
timer that tells you how much time is left in the trading period. The timer will turn red
when there are 10 seconds left in the trading period, as you can see in the screen. There
is a history panel in the lower part of the screen which will keep track of the history of the
current and all past rounds and matches.
Trading occurs in the following way. At any time during this trading period, any member
may post a bid to buy or an o¤er to sell one or multiple votes. At the bottom of the middle
trading panel there is an area where you can type in your bid or your o¤er. When you do
so, it will look like this: [SCREEN 2, 999 entered]. You also have to choose the amount of
units you want to buy or sell [SCREEN 3]. Your bids or o¤ers must always be between 1
and 1000. After you type in a price and a quantity, click the bidor o¤erbutton just
to the right, and your bid or o¤er (price and quantity) will be posted on the trading board
on the computer screens of all committee members, as you can see in this screen [SCREEN
4]. In this case, the column Bidder ID indicates that the member who made the bid was
member 3; the bid price indicates that the price is 999. In the Bidders Fullled columns
you can see two numbers: the one on the right indicates the number of units he bid for,
and the rst number indicates the number of partial acceptances. In our example, he made
a bid for one unit and nobody accepted so far. Whenever a new bid or o¤er is entered, it
is added to the board, and does not cancel any outstanding bids or o¤er if there are any.
When other members make bids or o¤ers, you will also see the additions to the table as you
can see now in the screen [SCREEN 5]. In this case member 2 made an o¤er for 201 for one
unit, and member 1 made a bid for two units at price 3 (the price indicates the price paid
per unit). All members in your committee see this information. The numbers on this slide
are for illustration only.
If another member has an active bid or o¤er, then you may accept it. In order to accept a
bid or an o¤er you just have to click on it and it will become highlighted in yellow [SCREEN
6]. In this case member 3 clicked the o¤er. At that point, a button below the table becomes
active. If there is only one unit to be transacted, as in this case, by clicking the button the
unit will be transacted and the transaction is highlighted in green [SCREEN 7].
If you accept an o¤er, as in this case, you will have an extra vote, and in exchange you
will pay the other member the price of his o¤er. This information is immediately updated
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on your screens. See that the table on the right has been updated: now member 3 has 2
votes and member 2 has none and the cash holdings have also been updated. Similarly, if
you have an active o¤er for exactly one unit, and another member accepts it, he will own
your vote and he will pay you the amount of your o¤er. The same goes for bids that are
accepted, except the transaction is a buy, by the person who posted the bid, rather than a
sell. Its very important to remember that you post a Bid if you want to buy and post an
o¤er if you want to sell!
If you accept a bid or o¤er and the order is for more than one unit, the transaction does
not take place until the whole order has been lled. Thus, if someone submitted a bid to
buy two votes, and you accept their bid, nothing happens yet because their order has not
yet been lled. [SCREEN 8] As you can see now, some member accepted member 1s bid. It
will be lled only after a second acceptance has been made, at which time both transactions
will be executed simultaneously and the transaction is highlighted in green [SCREEN 9].
If you have an active bid or o¤er that has not been transacted you can cancel it. To do
so, you need to click on it. [SCREEN 10] By doing so, the bid or o¤er will be highlighted in
yellow and cancel button will become active. Clicking the cancel button you will cancel the
bid or o¤er that you clicked on. It will then disappear from the screen [SCREEN 11]. If you
have accepted a bid or o¤er for multiple units which has not been transacted, you can also
cancel your partial acceptance. In that case, the bid or o¤er will remain in the screen but the
number of partial acceptances will be updated. You may also cancel all your untransacted
market activities at any time by clicking Cancel Allbutton, located on the right hand side
of the panel, below the table. See that, as the remaining time is less than 10 seconds, the
remaining time is red.
The trading period ends after 2 minutes. There are two additional trading rules. First,
if your cash holdings ever become 0 or negative, you may not place any bid nor accept any
o¤er until it becomes positive again. Second, you may not sell votes if you do not have any
or if all the votes you currently own are committed.
After 2 minutes, the trading stage of the round is over and we proceed to the voting stage.
Your screen would now look like [SCREEN 12]. At this stage, you simply cast your votes
by clicking on the vote button. These votes are automatically cast as votes for X if your
preferred outcome is X, and are automatically cast as votes for Y if your preferred outcome
is Y.
After you and the other members of the committee have voted, the results are displayed
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in the right hand panel, and summarized in the history screen. [SCREEN 13] We will then
proceed to the next round. [SCREEN 14] In the next round, as you can see in the right table,
all membersvotes will be reinitialized to one and your preferred outcome will be randomly
assigned. Because this round belongs to the same match, you will be able to see the bids
o¤ers and transactions of the previous rounds of the same match. [SCREEN 15].
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